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NEW CORPORATE FORMS AND GREEN BUSINESS
ANTONY PAGE*
ABSTRACT
You want to start a business: not just an ordinary business,
producing ordinary social benefit, but a dual-mission business that will
both make a profit and benefit the environment. This green business, you
expect, will sometimes face trade-offs between the missions, in the sense
that sometimes owners’ wealth and profit will have to be sacrificed to
pursue environmental benefits. You’re optimistic, in that you hope the
business will find outside investors and will scale up easily. Moreover,
you don’t want to lie or even dissemble about your motives or about the
business’s actions. You want to be both authentic and transparent. This
Article looks at whether and how law, by means of recently enacted cor-
porate organizational forms—benefit corporations, flexible purpose corpo-
rations and social purpose corporations—can help.
INTRODUCTION
Maryland started the trend with its enactment of the benefit
corporation in April 2010.1 The bill received overwhelming support:
unanimous in the Senate and 135–5 in the House.2 It was modeled on an
initiative from B Lab, a Pennsylvania-based non-profit that had already
pioneered a private certification program, the B Corporation,3 for socially
* Vice Dean & Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law,
Indianapolis. I would like to thank the editors and staff at this journal for their assis-
tance. This essay is based on a presentation at the 2012 William and Mary Environmental
Law and Policy Review Symposium, Managing Green Business: Defining, Regulating, and
Supporting Environmentally Responsible Businesses.
1 See John Tozzi, Maryland Passes ‘Benefit Corp.’ Law for Social Entrepreneurs, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 13, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/running_small
_business/archives/2010/04/benefit_corp_bi.html.
2 Id.
3 Id. A certified B Corporation is any organization, including LLCs or traditional cor-
porations, that has been “certified by the non[-]profit B Lab to meet rigorous standards
of social and environmental performance, accountability, and transparency.” What Are
B Corps?, CERTIFIED B CORPORATION, http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps (last
visited Jan. 31, 2013). It is like a good housekeeping seal of approval, rather than an
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oriented companies. The passage of the new form was hailed by B Lab co-
founder Jay Coen Gilbert as nothing short of “an inflection point in the
evolution of capitalism,”4 and by Maryland Senator Jamie Raskin as “a
great moment in evolution of commercial life in Maryland and America.”5
Since then, California (January 1, 2012), Hawaii (July 8, 2011),
Illinois (January 1, 2013), Massachusetts (January 1, 2013), Louisiana
(August 1, 2012), New Jersey (March 1, 2011), New York (February 10,
2012), South Carolina (June 14, 2012), Vermont (July 1, 2011) and Virginia
(July 1, 2011) have enacted similar forms, mostly with overwhelming
bipartisan support.6 California has also introduced the flexible purpose
corporation, which relaxes some of the statutory requirements of the ben-
efit corporation.7 According to some, this form, rather than the benefit
corporation, is better suited for larger publicly traded corporations that
would prefer a more legally unassailable social mission.8 Washington
State has followed this lead, with its similar social purpose corporation.9
The purpose of these new kinds of corporations is to provide an
organizational home, or legal architecture, suitable for hybrid, or dual-
mission, businesses.10 These businesses are intended both to make a
organizational form. See id. (claiming to be “to sustainable business what Fair Trade
certification is to coffee or USDA Organic certification is to milk.”).
4 Press Release, B Lab/B Corp., Maryland First State in Union to Pass Benefit Corporation
Legislation, CORP. SOC. RESP. NEWSWIRE (Apr. 14, 2010, 10:57 AM), http://www.csrwire
.com/press_releases/29332-Maryland-First-State-in-Union-to-Pass-Benefit -Corporation
-Legislation.
5 Id.
6 State by State Legislative Status, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CTR., http://benefitcorp.net/state
-by-state-legislative-status (last visited Jan. 31, 2013).
7 See Debra Bowen, Two New Types of Corporations Effective January 1, 2012, SEC’Y ST.
CAL. (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.sos.ca.gov/business/be/forms/flexible-purpose-corp-and
-benefit-corp.pdf.
8 See Christen Clarke, Note, California’s Flexible Purpose Corporation: A Step Forward,
a Step Back, or No Step at All?, 5 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 301, 317–18 (2012).
9 C. Kent Carlson et al., Washington State Passes Legislation Authorizing Social Purpose
Corporations: Bill to Permit Corporations to Seek Social, Environmental-Oriented Goals,
K&L GATES, LLP (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.klgates.com/washington-state-passes
-legislation-authorizing-social-purpose-corporations-bill-to-permit-corporations-to
-seek-social-environmental-oriented-goals-04-11-2012/.
10 These legislative attempts are not the first modifications to the corporate form intended
to assist dual-mission businesses. Oregon, for example, passed an amendment to its
corporate code providing that a corporation’s articles could include a “provision autho-
rizing or directing the corporation to conduct the business of the corporation in a manner
that is environmentally and socially responsible.” OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.047(2)(e) (West
2012). The goals were apparently “to both recruit new green businesses to Oregon and
encourage existing Oregon businesses to improve the sustainability of their operations.”
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profit and to create a benefit for society above and beyond what a tradi-
tional business creates,11 without the problems that are perceived with
either the traditional corporate form or the non-profit form. As the
California assemblyman who authored his state’s legislation said, “Bene-
fit corporations offer for-profit companies a way to do well and do right. . . .
There is a way to create jobs and grow the economy while raising the bar
for social and environmental responsibility.”12
So far the list of benefit corporations is relatively small.13 Perhaps
not surprisingly given that it is a relatively new form, the only ones that
people are likely to recognize are the clothing manufacturer Patagonia,
Inc.,14 and perhaps Greyston Bakery, which was made famous by Ben &
Jerry’s.15 Both became benefit corporations as soon as the form was
available in their respective states, and they were the first to register.16
Greyston Bakery’s CEO observed, “benefit corporations are using the
power of business to solve social and environmental issues and it is our
goal at Greyston to set an example for other social enterprises as we
embrace our new corporate status.”17
Robert C. Illig, Oregon’s Experiment With Sustainable Corporate Governance: A Friendly
Critique, 25 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 189, 189, 191 (2010) (criticizing the provision for merely
making “explicit what [had] always been implicit”).
11 Traditional businesses pay taxes, create jobs, and fill consumer needs, among other
social benefits. See Sanjay B. Varshney & Dennis H. Tootelian, The Economic Impact of
the Small Business and Disabled Veteran Business Enterprise Programs on the State of
California, CAL. DEP’T OF GEN. SERVS. (June 2009), http://www.documents.dgs.ca.gov/dgs
/PIO/SB/SmallBusinessStudy.pdf.
12 Marc Lifsher, Businesses Seek State’s New ‘Benefit Corporation’ Status, L.A. TIMES
(Jan. 4, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/04/business/la-fi-benefit-corporations
-20120104.
13 An incomplete list of benefit corporations is available at Craig R. Everett, Benefit
Corporations Research, CRAIG EVERETT’S OFFICIAL WEBSITE, http://craigeverett.com/benefit
-corporations.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2013); see also BENEFIT CORP. INFORMATION CENTER,
http://www.benefitcorp.net (last visited Jan. 31, 2013).
14 See Lisa Gardiner, From Synchilla to School Support: Outdoor Clothing Manufacturer
Patagonia Recognized for Corporate Responsibility, SANTA CLARA U., http://www.scu.edu
/ethics/publications/iie/v8n1/synchilla.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2013).
15 See Matt Sledge, Benefit Corporations Aim to Help Capitalism Save Itself, HUFFINGTON
POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/27/benefit-corporations-patagonia-greyston
-bakery_n_1632318.html (last updated Aug. 20, 2012, 5:12 PM).
16 See Mat McDermott, Patagonia Becomes a California Benefit Corporation, TREEHUGGER
(Jan. 3, 2012), http://www.treehugger.com/corporate-responsibility /patagonia-becomes
-california-benefit-corporation.html; Greyston Bakery First of New York Roll Out Benefit
Corporations, ZEN PEACEMAKERS (Feb. 17, 2012), http://zenpeacemakers.org/2012/02/new
-york-rolls-out-new-kind-of-corporation/.
17 Greyston Bakery Becomes New York’s First Benefit Corporation, GREYSTON BAKERY,
http://www.greystonbakery.com/category/news/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2013).
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Amidst all the hype it is worth analyzing how these new corporate
forms might function for green businesses, those organizations that are
taking voluntary actions intended to better environmental performance.18
Are they really a step forward, and if so, is the benefit or flexible purpose
model likely to prove better?
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I briefly examines the per-
ceived problems with existing forms, both for-profit and non-profit. Part II
analyzes the hybrid answer for green business. Specifically, it focuses on
benefit corporations and the recently enacted flexible purpose corpora-
tions. It notes the strengths and weaknesses of each form for green busi-
nesses. The Conclusion recognizes the limited role for organizational law.
I. PERCEIVED AND ACTUAL PROBLEMS OF EXISTING FORMS
Would-be founders of hybrid businesses, or social enterprise, have
traditionally had the choice of non-profit or for-profit organizations. Both
are perceived as having weaknesses.
Corporations. There is an ongoing debate regarding whether the
traditional corporate form is suitable for double bottom line companies,
including those that pursue green goals.19 Opponents of the traditional
18 Green business can be defined in several different ways. This definition is drawn from
Dennis D. Hirsch, Green Business and the Importance of Reflexive Law: What Michael
Porter Didn’t Say, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 1063, 1063 (2010). Hirsch identifies nine categories
of “green business behavior.” Id. at 1072. Hirsch explains claiming that:
[w]hen firms go green, they exceed legal requirements by: (1) directly
reducing their own regulated—or unregulated—environmental impacts
in ways that will reduce regulatory risk, improve company brand, and
allow firms to get out in front of anticipated regulations; (2) reducing
their customers’ environmental impacts and decreasing their customers’
exposure to unhealthy substances; (3) increasing their reuse and recy-
cling of materials used in the production process; (4) improving their
energy efficiency or that of their customers; (5) improving their resource
productivity or that of their customers; (6) implementing systems to
identify waste reduction, pollution prevention, energy efficiency, or re-
source productivity opportunities throughout the company or facility;
(7) collecting and disseminating more information about the firm’s envi-
ronmental impacts and performance than the law requires; (8) providing
more opportunities for stakeholder input into corporate environmental
decision making than the law requires; and (9) financing and investing
in green products and business models, such as those described above.
Id. (emphasis added).
19 See Antony Page, Has Corporate Law Failed? Addressing Proposals for Reform, 107
MICH. L. REV. 979, 987–88 (2009). For arguments against a requirement of shareholder
wealth maximization, see, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People’s
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corporate form claim that corporations are legally obliged to maximize
shareholder welfare, which traditionally means maximizing profits.20
Typically, they cite to the venerable 1919 case of Dodge v. Ford, in which
the Michigan Supreme Court arguably held that the Ford Motor Company
nonpayment of special dividends was impermissible because the company’s
motive was philanthropic.21 They also reference the sale in 2000 of socially
and environmentally oriented Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, Inc. to the multi-
national Unilever, supposedly required by corporate law against the wishes
of the company’s board of directors.22 More recently, opponents have cited
the case of eBay v. Newmark in which the Delaware court struck down one
of Craigslist’s defensive measures, a shareholder rights plan (or “poison
pill”), in part because its purpose was not to advance shareholder welfare.23
The argument is that assuming corporations must maximize profit,
they will be unable to effectively pursue their social or environmental mis-
sion.24 Profit maximization would in fact prevent Kaldor-Hicks efficient
transactions that would even minimally harm shareholders. (A Kaldor-
Hicks transaction is one that benefits one group of stakeholders more
than it harms another group of stakeholders: the winners win more than
the losers lose.)25 Put differently, even if the transaction has a net benefit
it is still impermissible if the shareholders would be the losers. In the case
of a change of control transaction, only the shareholders’ interests count,
meaning that if there is to be a sale it must be to the highest bidder.26
Money, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1309 (2008); Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in
the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2005); Ian B. Lee, Corporate Law, Profit
Maximization, and the “Responsible” Shareholder, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 31, 33–36
(2005); Lawrence E. Mitchell & Theresa A. Gabaldon, If I Only Had a Heart: Or, How
Can We Identify a Corporate Morality, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1645, 1666–67 (2002); Judd F.
Sneirson, Green Is Good: Sustainability, Profitability, and a New Paradigm for Corporate
Governance, 94 IOWA L. REV. 987, 995–1007 (2009); Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop
Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163 (2008).
20 See Page, supra note 19, at 988. The issue is only with the corporate form. Limited
Liability Companies clearly need not profit maximize. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-
106(a) (West 2011) (“A limited liability company may carry on any lawful business,
purpose or activity, whether or not for profit . . . .”).
21 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
22 See generally Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law
and the Sale of a Social Enterprise Icon, 35 VT. L. REV. 211, 211–13 (2010).
23 eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).
24 See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 1970), available at http://www.colorado.edu/studentgroups/libertarians
/issues/friedman-soc-resp-business.html.
25 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW, 18 (8th ed. 2011).
26 See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
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Leaving the discussion over what corporate law actually requires
with respect to shareholder wealth maximization, even if this is correct,
this does not mean that there is a practical method of legal enforcement.
Courts are typically extremely deferential to the business decisions of
unbiased directors, and as a result operating decisions are almost never
overturned.27 Under the business judgment rule, courts are comfortable
allowing directors virtually unreviewable authority.28 As former Delaware
Chancellor William T. Allen, Vice Chancellor Jack Jacobs, and Vice Chan-
cellor Leo Strine put it, the business judgment rule is “an expression of
a policy of non-review of a board of directors’ decision.”29 Although the
director’s standard of conduct (how legislatures and judges hope directors
will behave) may appear high, the judicial standard of review (the line
between where courts will take action and where they will not) is much
lower. There is a gap between these two standards that allows an enor-
mous amount of discretion for directors that choose to pursue green
goals. Thus commentators can reasonably conclude that “American cor-
porate law permits firms to pursue . . . green practices and business
plans.”30 Traditional companies can promote themselves as though they
are green companies.
Consider Procter & Gamble (“P&G”), although there are numer-
ous examples. P&G’s “long-term environmental sustainability vision . . .
includes: [p]owering our plants with 100% renewable energy; [u]sing
100% renewable or recycled materials for all products and packaging;
[h]aving zero consumer and manufacturing waste go to landfills; [and]
designing products that delight consumers while maximizing our conser-
vation of resources.”31
P&G’s stated intention is to “deliver products with an improved
environmental profile” and to “improve the environmental profile of our
own operations.”32 These actions may be profit maximizing, or they may
27 See, e.g., FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 4.1.2, at 278–79 (2000) (“The idea
underlying the [business judgment] rule is that courts should exercise restraint in hold-
ing directors liable for (or otherwise second guessing) business decisions which produce
poor results or with which reasonable minds might disagree.”).
28 Id.
29 William T. Allen et al., Function over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in
Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. L. 1287, 1297–98 (2001) (emphasis added).
30 Judd F. Sneirson, Race to the Left: A Legislator’s Guide to Greening a Corporate Code,
88 OR. L. REV. 491, 496 (2009).
31 Sustainability Overview, PROCTER & GAMBLE, http://www.pg.com/en_US/sustainability
/overview.shtml (last visited Jan. 31, 2013).
32 Environmental Sustainability, PROCTER & GAMBLE, http://www.pg.com/en_US/sustainability
/environmental_sustainability/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 31, 2013).
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simply be greenwashing, but facially, at least, they look green, and
shareholders have not sued the company.33
Likewise, there are virtually no judicially imposed limits on a
corporation’s charitable donations. Legislators and courts have expressly
permitted corporations to make these donations,34 and absent a clear
conflict of interest, courts are loath to interfere. Sometimes, even if there
is a conflict of interest, courts are reluctant or unable to interfere. In a
notorious case involving Armand Hammer, Occidental Petroleum agreed
to donate to the Armand Hammer Museum of Art and Cultural Center.35
The court noted that “[i]f the Court was a stockholder of Occidental it
might vote for new directors, if it was on the Board it might vote for new
management and if it was a member of the Special Committee it might
vote against the Museum project” but as a judge he would likely have to
allow the expenditure under the business judgment rule.36 A corporation
could aggressively pursue an environmental mission in the sense that it
would donate a significant percentage of its profits to an environmentally
oriented charity. Would-be conflict with corporate law only occurs when
the business is making operating decisions that are no longer in the
interests of profit maximization.
Legally, it would be possible for an entrepreneur to form a tradi-
tional profit maximizing corporation and simultaneously form a non-
profit. The two organizations could then work together, in that the
corporation could donate a significant portion of its profits to the non-
profit which could then fund projects to ameliorate the environment. As
long as the non-profit’s use of funds was consistent with its charitable
purpose, the non-profit could provide assistance,37 so that the for-profit
33 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 207(e) (West 2012) (providing that corporations have the
power to “[m]ake donations, regardless of specific corporate benefit, for the public welfare
or for community fund, hospital, charitable, educational, scientific, civic, or similar.”); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 9 (2012) (granting corporations the power to “make donations for the
public welfare or for charitable, scientific, or educational purposes . . .”); MODEL BUS. CORP.
ACT § 3.02(13) (2005) (“Unless its articles of incorporation provide otherwise . . . (13) to make
donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific, or educational purposes . . . .”).
34 See R. Franklin Balotti & James Hanks, Jr., Giving at the Office: A Reappraisal of
Charitable Contributions by Corporations, 54 BUS. L. 965, 966 (1999) (“The present law
regarding a corporation’s power to make altruistic charitable contributions (i.e., chari-
table contributions with no underlying business benefit) in most, if not all, American ju-
risdictions is one of the few rules of corporation law that permits a corporation to take
action largely irrespective of corporate benefit.”).
35 Sullivan v. Hammer, No. CIV.A.10823, 1990 WL 114223 at *1625–26 (Del. Ch. Aug. 14,
1990).
36 Id. at *1630.
37 See Page & Katz, supra note 22, at 219.
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would operate in a more environmentally friendly manner. This could,
of course, be a legally complicated, Rube Goldberg–like arrangement, but
conceptually it would be legal.38
Finally, this is not a problem, or at least not so much a problem,
for closely held corporations. If there is only one shareholder, or a small
number of like-minded shareholders, corporations can clearly pursue
whatever mission the shareholders want.39 After all, nobody but the
shareholders would even have standing to sue. Thus, closely or solely
held companies with long histories that have recently become benefit
corporations, like Patagonia and Greyston Bakery,40 were not actually
hampered in their pursuit of goals other than or additional to profit.
Contractarians, those who view corporations as a “nexus of con-
tracts,”41 should have no issue with corporations that choose to pursue
dual missions as long as this goal is clearly stated ex ante. For them,
profit maximization is simply a default principle that can be easily
varied.42 As two leading contractarians, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel
Fischel wrote:
[W]hat is the goal of the corporation? Is it profit, and for
whom? Social welfare more broadly defined? . . . Our re-
sponse . . . who cares? If the New York Times is formed to
publish a newspaper first and make a profit second, no
one should be allowed to object. Those who came in at the
beginning consented, and those who came later bought
stock the price of which reflected the corporation’s tem-
pered commitment to a profit objective. If a corporation is
started with a promise to pay half of the profits to the
38 It is perhaps not all that different from Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, Inc. and the Ben &
Jerry’s Foundation, in that the foundation was the sole holder of preferred stock that held
a veto right over the company’s change of control transactions. See Page & Katz, supra
note 22, at 238.
39 See John Tozzi, Patagonia Road Tests New Sustainability Legal Status, BLOOMBERG
(Jan. 4, 2012, 7:57 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-04/patagonia-road-tests
-new-sustainability-legal-status.html.
40 See Lifsher, supra note 12, Greyston Bakery, supra note 17; Tozzi, supra note 39.
41 Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON U. L. REV.
99, 100 (1988) (“The contractual theory views the corporation as founded in private con-
tract, where the role of the state is limited to enforcing contracts. In this regard, a state
charter merely recognizes the existence of a ‘nexus of contracts’ called a corporation.”).
42 See id. “Freedom of contract requires that parties to the ‘nexus of contracts’ must be
allowed to structure their relations as they desire.” Id.
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employees rather than the equity investors, that too is
simply a term of the contract.43
More broadly, there is a long-standing dispute about what a cor-
poration’s purpose ought to be.44 Dating back to at least the early 1930s,
there have been those who support shareholder wealth maximization de-
bating with those who believe that corporations should assume greater
social, and more recently environmental, obligations.45 Berle and Dodd’s
famous debate in the pages of the Harvard Law Review are a prominent
early instance of that.46 Interestingly, both participants later reversed
their views. Later, Milton Friedman in the New York Times stated that
“there is one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its
resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits.”47 The
debate itself has proved inconclusive with multiple iterations and no
clear winner.48
Hybrid businesses are perhaps a way out of this debate, for some
of the arguments in favor of shareholder wealth maximization depend on
the notion that a corporation’s directors are agents of the shareholders
with primary responsibilities to the shareholders.49 If the shareholders
would like a corporation to pursue a green mission in addition to profit
maximization there should be no dispute.50 Moreover, even if “American
43 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW 35–36 (1991). See also Jonathan R. Macey, A Close Read of an Excellent Commentary
on Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 177, 179 (2008) (stating that “maximizing share-
holder gain is only a default rule” and that “[s]hareholders could opt out of this goal if
they so desired.”).
44 See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist
Origin: Adolf Berle and the “Modern Corporation,” 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 100 (2008) (“A con-
tinuing and longstanding debate has been waged in corporate law scholarship among those
who favor shareholder primacy, those who favor management discretion, and those who
believe that corporations have a social responsibility to other constituencies, such as the
corporation’s employees, and the wider public interest.”).
45 See id. at 102.
46 See id. at 101.
47 Friedman, supra note 24.
48 See Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV.
497, 501 (1981).
49 See Friedman, supra note 24 (“the key point is that, in his capacity as a corporate ex-
ecutive, the manager is the agent of the individuals who own the corporation or establish
the eleemosynary institution, and his primary responsibility is to them.”). In fact, a co-
founder of B Lab, Andrew Kassoy, claimed that “Milton Friedman would have loved” the
benefit corporation. CORP. SOC. RESP. NEWSWIRE, supra note 4.
50 Thus a business like Newground Social Investment will convert into a social purpose
corporation it will largely be symbolic since there is only one shareholder. John Tozzi,
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corporate law tolerates green businesses . . . [it] generally stops there,
however, and neither encourages green business efforts nor particularly
discourages them.”51 Hybrid forms might actually encourage such efforts.
Non-profits. Non-profits have a very different shortcoming from the
corporate form. The distinguishing legal feature of the non-profit is the
non-distribution constraint, which is simply a “prohibition on the distri-
bution of profits.”52 A non-profit’s assets are locked up: there are no owners,
and there is no potential for extraordinary returns.53 As a result, there is
no equity, and non-profits have to depend upon other sources, notably do-
native income.54 Given that there are shortages of donative income, it is
hard for non-profits to collect adequate amounts of capital and, thus,
harder for them to grow quickly.55 For non-profits earning a significant
amount of income, there are some legal constraints such as the unrelated
business income tax.56 Moreover, because there is no equity it is harder
to introduce incentive-based compensation.57 Put differently, there are no
stock options in the non-profit world. In addition, the public is likely to view
it as unseemly if the employees of non-profits receive high compensation.58
II. THE HYBRID ANSWER FOR GREEN BUSINESS
New hybrid forms attempt to resolve the apparent shortcomings
of traditional organizational forms by combining features of both the
for-profit and non-profit world. These new hybrid forms include the com-
munity interest company in the United Kingdom, the low-profit lim-
ited liability company, or L3C, the benefit LLC, the benefit corporation,
and the closely related flexible purpose corporation and social purpose
Washington State Tailors ‘Social Purpose Corporation’ to Sustainable Business, BLOOMBERG
BUS. WK. (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-03-16/washington
-state-tailors-social-purpose-corporation-to-sustainable-business.
51 Sneirson, supra note 30, 491–92.
52 See Hansmann, supra note 48, at 501.
53 See id. at 521.
54 See id. at 502.
55 See id. at 549.
56 See Henry B. Hansmann, Unfair Competition and the Unrelated Business Income Tax,
75 VA. L. REV. 605, 605 (1989).
57 See DAN PALOTTA, UNCHARITABLE: HOW RESTRAINTS ON NONPROFITS UNDERMINE THEIR
POTENTIAL 119 (2009).
58 Coaches of college football and basketball teams may be an exception to this rule. For
a compilation of salaries for college football coaches, see College Football Coach Salary
Database, 2006–2011, USA TODAY (Nov. 17, 2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports
/college/football/story/2011-11-17/cover-college-football-coaches-salaries-rise/51242232/1.
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corporation.59 This Article will look specifically at the benefit corporation
and compare and contrast it to the flexible or social purpose corporation.
The benefit corporation has been enacted in eleven states (Cali-
fornia, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
New York, South Carolina, Vermont, Virginia)60 and proposed in at least
fourteen more,61 while other states have not been able to pass the proposed
legislation.62 There are significant differences in the various enactments
and six major differences from the traditional corporation: purpose, fidu-
ciary duties, reporting, third-party standards, enforceability or derivative
suits, and what can be broadly characterized as governance procedures.63
In addition to the benefit corporation, there are two other corpo-
rate forms that have been introduced for dual-mission businesses. These
include the social purpose corporation in Washington,64 and the flexible
purpose corporation in California that was introduced simultaneously
with, and as an alternative to, its benefit corporation.65 Both are similar
to each other, but differ from benefit corporations in terms of their stated
purpose, use of a third-party standard, use of benefit enforcement pro-
ceedings, and grant to shareholders of dissenters rights.66
59 See Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of Organization?,
46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 591–92 (2011).
60 See Passing Legislation, B. CORP., http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/legislation
(last visited Jan. 31, 2013).
61 For a listing of relevant bills, see Assemb. B. 361, 2011 Sess. (Cal 2011); S. B. 298, 2011
Leg., 26th Sess. (Haw. 2011); S. B. 2987, 97th Gen. Assemb., 2012 Sess. (Ill. 2012); H. B.
1178, 2012, Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2012); St. 2012, c.238, § 52, 2012 Sess. (Mass. 2012): S.
B. 609, 2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2010); S. 2170, 2010 Leg., 214th Sess. (N.J. 2012); S.
79A, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011); B. 4766, 119th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C.
2011); H. B. 2358, 2011 Leg., Gen. Assemb. (Va. 2011); S. 263, 2010 Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Vt. 2010); H. B. 2239, 62nd Leg., 2012 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012) (using the term
“social purpose corporations.”).
62 Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin are states where benefit corporations have
been seriously proposed. See Passing Legislation, supra note 60. For other states’ attempts,
see S. B. 12-182, 68th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2012) (referring unamended to
House Committee of the Whole); H. B. 757, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2011) (failing in
subcommittee Mar. 9, 2012); S. B. 433, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2011) (tabling);
Assemb. B. 742, 2011 Reg. Sess. (Wisc. 2011) (failing in the Senate). For bills referred to
subcommittees, see S. B. 569 , 2012 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2012); H. B. 5490, 2012 Gen. Assemb.
(Conn. 2012); S. B. 359, 2011 Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2011); S. F. 87-1572, 8th Leg. Sess. (Minn.
2012); S. B. 26, 2011 Gen. Assemb. (N.C. 2011).
63 See Reiser, supra note 59, at 600, 604–06.
64 See H. B. 2239, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012).
65 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602 (West 2012).
66 Memorandum from The Volunteer Legal Services Program of the Bar Association of San
Francisco (2012), available at http://www.sfbar.org/forms/vlsp/benefit-corp-memo%20.pdf;
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All of the above corporate forms are primarily governed by the
respective state’s preexisting corporate law.67 Similarly, they must in-
clude the new designation in their name, note that it will be governed by
the particular chapter of the corporate code, and state its general public
benefit, social purpose or special purpose, or specific benefit.68 No doubt
in the interests of full disclosure to potentially unwary investors, a social
purpose corporation must also include in its articles language stating
“[t]he mission of this social purpose corporation is not necessarily com-
patible with and may be contrary to maximizing profits and earnings for
shareholders, or maximizing shareholder value in any sale, merger, ac-
quisition, or other similar actions of the corporation.”69
Much, however, of what is required for a benefit corporation is
optional for the social purpose corporation, and in some cases the social
purpose corporation is even given additional latitude. For example, it may
require directors to consider the impacts of a decision on the social purpose
corporation’s purpose; an assessment provided to shareholders based on
a third-party standard; and a supermajority vote for any corporate action,
including those for which shareholder approval is not otherwise required.70
In addition, the corporation’s existence may be limited to a specified date
and it is also permitted to designate specific social purposes.71
Purpose. All benefit corporations must have a “general public ben-
efit” that is generally defined as “a material positive impact on society
and the environment taken as a whole, as measured by a third-party
standard, from the business and operations of a benefit corporation.”72
Brian Howe, Building Companies with a Social Purpose, SEATTLE BUS., http://www.seattle
businessmag.com/business-corners/law/building-companies-social-purpose (last visited
Jan. 31, 2013).
67 See H. B. 2239 § 2, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012) (“Except as otherwise expressly
stated in this [social purpose corporation] chapter . . . references in this title to the term
‘corporation’ shall be read to include social purpose corporations organized under this
chapter.”); CAL. CORP. CODE § 2501 (West 2012).
68 California is similar. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602 (West 2012).
69 WASH. REV. CODE. § 23B.25.040 (2012). In California, if the business is related to bank-
ing, insurers, professional corporations or close corporations, other provisions are also
required. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2501 (West 2012).
70 WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.25.040.2(a)–(e) (2012).
71 WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.25.040.2(d)–(e) (2012).
72 WILLIAM H. CLARK JR. & LARRY VRANKA, THE NEED AND RATIONALE FOR THE BENEFIT
CORPORATION: WHY IT IS THE LEGAL FORM THAT BEST ADDRESSES THE NEEDS OF SOCIAL
ENTREPRENEURS, INVESTORS, AND, ULTIMATELY, THE PUBLIC 15 (2012), available at http://
benefitcorp.net/for-attorneys/benefit-corp-white-paper.
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Several states, however, require instead that the general benefit must
result from activities that advance specific public benefits.73
Benefit corporations may also specify in their articles (or in some
cases bylaws)74 one or several “specific public benefits,” which is gener-
ally one related to underprivileged populations, health improvements,
environment, education, arts, science, or the increase of capital to organi-
zations intended to provide public benefits.75 All but one state has also
included a catch-all provision that captures the conferring of “any other
particular benefit on society or the environment.”76 Massachusetts, for
example, is fairly typical. Its statute provides that:
“Specific public benefit”, [includes] any of the following:
(1) providing low-income or underserved individuals or
communities with beneficial products or services; (2) pro-
moting economic opportunity for individuals or commu-
nities beyond the creation of jobs in the normal course of
business; (3) promoting the preservation and conservation
of the environment; (4) improving human health; (5) pro-
moting the arts, sciences, access to and advancement of
knowledge; (6) increasing or facilitating the flow of capital
and assets to entities with a general public benefit pur-
pose; or (7) conferring any other particular benefit on so-
ciety or the environment.77
Hawaii’s law is even more specific, adding provisions related to
the use of patents, the upholding of fair labor standards nationally and
73 See, e.g., Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-01 (West 2011) (“activities
that promote a combination of specific public benefits”); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 14A:18-1 (West 2011); New York, N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1702(b) (McKinney 2012)
(explaining the definition of “public benefit”); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.08
(West 2011) (“The articles of incorporation . . . may identify one or more specific pub-
lic benefits . . . .”).
74 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-787(a) (2011).
75 Virginia adds religious purpose to that list. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782 (2011).
76 N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1702(e) (Consol. 2012). Louisiana is the only state that does not
include a catchall provision. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1803 (2012). Some states use
different language, like Vermont. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.03 (2011) (“[T]he accom-
plishment of any other identifiable benefit for society or the environment.”).
77 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156e, § 10(a)(2) (2012).
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internationally,78 the creation and retention of good jobs,79 and the
enhancement of environmental protection.80
With respect to the specific public benefit relating to the envi-
ronment, particular language ranges from merely “preserving the en-
vironment,”81 “preserving or improving the environment,”82 to “preserving
the environment, promoting positive impacts on the environment, or re-
ducing negative impacts on the environment.”83 Given the catch-all
provision—any particular or identifiable benefit for the environment—
it is not clear that specific language related to the environment makes
any real difference.
A social purpose corporation’s mission is phrased differently from
that of a benefit corporation’s express purpose of a “material positive impact
on society and the environment.”84 Instead, a social purpose corporation:
[must be] organized to carry out [its specified] business
purpose in a manner intended to promote positive short-
term or long-term effects of, or minimize adverse short-
term or long-term effects of, the corporation’s activities
upon any or all of (1) the corporation’s employees, suppli-
ers, or customers; (2) the local, state, national, or world
community; or (3) the environment.85
A flexible purpose corporation must pursue a special purpose
which is either “[o]ne or more charitable or public purpose activities that
a nonprofit public benefit corporation is authorized to carry out” or “[t]he
purpose of promoting positive short-term or long-term effects of, or min-
imizing adverse short-term or long-term effects of, the flexible purpose
corporation’s activities upon any of the following: (i) [t]he flexible purpose
78 HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D.5(b) (West 2011) (“Creating and retaining good jobs within the
State as well as throughout the United States . . . .”).
79 Id. (“Upholding fair labor standards nationally and internationally; provided for pur-
poses of this paragraph, ‘fair labor standards’ shall be construed to prohibit child labor,
forced or compulsory labor, discrimination in employment, restrictions on freedom of
association, and denial of the right to collective bargaining . . . .”).
80 Id. (“Enhancing environmental protection nationally and internationally . . .”).
81 MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-01(d) (West 2011).
82 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782 (West 2011).
83 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1803 (2010).
84 CLARK & VRANKA, supra note 72, at 15.
85 WASH. SOC. PURPOSE CORP. APPLICATION, available at http://www.sos.wa.gov/_assets
/corps/SocialPurposeCorp.pdf.
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corporation’s employees, suppliers, customers, and creditors. (ii) [t]he
community and society. (iii) [t]he environment.”86
For green businesses, the specific purpose or public benefit is not
an issue. Any plausible environmental goal would be sufficient. A con-
cern, however, is that the environmental purpose chosen might be trivial,
or might be something that the company was already doing.87 As one
commentator on California’s version noted, a company can use its “carbon
emissions abatement presently pursued, [could be] an excuse for reincor-
porating as a flexible purpose corporation for the benefit of being known
as doing good.”88 This low bar avoids problems in determining what kind
of green benefits are sufficient or who the decision makers should be.
There could, however, be problems, at least conceptually, with the
benefit corporation’s general public benefit. A benefit corporation must
create a material positive impact on society and the environment.89 Pre-
sumably, creating a material positive impact on the environment alone
would be insufficient (i.e., the argument that a material positive impact
on the environment would necessarily also be a material positive impact
on society would be unavailing), and the environmental and social benefits
could be in conflict. A business that chooses to privilege the environment
over social concerns might find itself violating this provision. Thus a com-
pany like Guayaki, which has an environmental mission of preserving the
Amazon rainforest,90 might pay its U.S. workers below the poverty rate.
It should also be noted that one up-front cost that is increased
with these new forms is that a hybrid corporation must define its social
benefit and purpose in advance for the articles of incorporation.91 This
requires sufficient agreement among the founders and could be time-
consuming. It might also prove futile if the business or business context
do not develop as expected. Granted, clear articulation of the mission
may also have benefits.92 This contrasts with a traditional corporation
86 CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602(b)(2) (West 2012 & Supp. 2012).
87 W. Derrick Britt et al., Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About the Flexible Purpose
Corporation (and Then Some), BUS. FOR GOOD (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.businessforgood
.co/2011/03/frequently-asked-questions-proposed.html.
88 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
89 CLARK & VRANKA, supra note 72, at 1.
90 The Guayaki Story, GUAYAKI, http://guayaki.com/about/134/The-Guayak%26iacute;-Story
.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2013).
91 Jamie Raskin, The Rise of Benefit Corporations, THE NATION (June 8, 2011), http://www
.thenation.com/article/161261/rise-benefit-corporations.
92 See Reiser, supra note 59.
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where the articles of incorporation typically merely state the corporation
is being formed for any lawful business purpose.93
Fiduciary duties. As with a traditional corporation, directors will
have the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care.94 Legislatures do not intend
any changes to the duty of loyalty, which, of course, is intended to cap-
ture conflict of interest situations.95 The duty of care, however, is altered,
in that directors of benefit corporations have an affirmative duty to con-
sider certain other interests besides those of shareholders, and they are
also permitted to consider almost any non-shareholder interest.96
Massachusetts, for example, requires that the board of directors,
board committees and the individual director consider the effects of any
action on shareholders, employees, customers (as beneficiaries of the pub-
lic benefit corporations’s purpose), the community and societal factors, the
local, regional and global environment, the benefit corporation’s short-
term and long-term interests, the accomplishment of the benefit corpora-
tion’s purposes, and whether remaining independent may be in the best
interests of the corporation.97
93 See CLARK & VRANKA, supra note 72, at 16.
94 See id. at 8.
95 See Reiser, supra note 59, at 601.
96 See id. at 599.
97 A. In discharging the duties of their respective positions and in
considering the best interests of the benefit corporation, the
board of directors, committees of the board and individual di-
rectors of a benefit corporation:
1. shall consider the effects of any action upon:
i. the shareholders of the benefit corporation;
ii. the employees and workforce of the benefit
corporation, its subsidiaries and its suppliers;
iii. the interest of customers or clients as benef-
iciaries of the general public benefit or spe-
cific public benefit purposes of the benefit
corporation;
iv. community and societal factors, including
those of each community in which offices or
facilities of the benefit corporation, its sub-
sidiaries or its suppliers are located;
v. the local, regional and global environment;
vi. the short-term and long-term interests of
the benefit corporation, including benefits
that may accrue to the benefit corporation
from its long-term plans and the possibility
that these interests may be best served by
the continued independence of the benefit
corporation; and
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This last bullet point is clearly intended to allow directors to
refuse an unwanted takeover bid. Other states have addressed this in
different ways, such as silence,98 or permissively allowing directors to
consider “[t]he resources, intent, and conduct of any person seeking to
acquire control of the [benefit] corporation.”99
In case the list of mandatory concerns is insufficient, directors
also have the option of considering state, regional and national economic
interests, or “other pertinent factors or the interests of any other group
that they deem appropriate.”100
Directors need use “sound and reasonable judgment” for their
decision-making, and need not prioritize any particular interest unless
the articles have stated that there will be prioritization.101 Some states
have not included this prioritization language.102
There are other minor differences among the states, however,
given that all include permissive language, like the provision quoted
above, and none would necessarily be dispositive with respect to the
actual decision reached (just as with judicial multifactored tests), it is
unlikely that these differences will prove significant.
For a flexible purpose corporation, fiduciary duties are also more
flexible, in that a director or officer may consider the corporation’s so-
cial purpose, but need not.103 Directors are essentially protected by the
vii. the ability of the benefit corporation to ac-
complish its general public benefit purpose
and any specific public benefit purpose . . .
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156E, § 10(a)(2) (2011).
98 See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-07 (West 2011).
99 HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D.6 (West 2011).
100 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156E, § 10(a)(2) (West 2011) (Directors “may consider: (i) the
interests of the economy of the state, the region and the country . . . ; or (ii) other
pertinent factors or the interests of any other group that they deem appropriate.”).
101 (b) Directors shall consider the factors in clause (1) of subsection (a) using
sound and reasonable judgment in determining corporate actions and
the best interests of the benefit corporation. Directors shall not be re-
quired to give priority to the interests of a particular person or group
referred to in clauses (1) or (2) of said subsection (a) over the interests
of any other person or group unless the benefit corporation has stated
in its articles its intention to give priority to certain interests related
to its accomplishment of its general public benefit purpose or of a spe-
cific public benefit purpose identified in its articles.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156E, § 10 (b) (West 2011).
102 See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-07 (West 2011).
103 See MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2602(2)(B)(ii) (West 2011).
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business judgment rule in the same way as directors of traditional corpo-
rations,104 but are also expressly protected from liability with respect to
those decisions that balance profit-making and the pursuit of the mission.105
A criticism of both types of hybrid corporation is that the legisla-
tion provides little guidance on how directors should make decisions.106
In other words, after considering the effect on the various enumerated
stakeholders, and optionally considering anything else deemed relevant,
how is the director supposed to prioritize?107 In some cases, the various
potential effects of an action will be completely incommensurate. How,
for example, would one compare the impairment of a scenic view with
lost jobs? Or, to cite a recent example, the increase in food-borne illnesses
with the reduction of the use of plastic grocery bags?108 The result is a
lack of accountability.
Reporting. Benefit corporations are required to prepare and re-
lease an “annual benefit report.”109 The report must describe ways the
benefit corporation pursued both the general public benefit and any
specific public benefit, the extent to which either kind of public benefit
was created, and circumstances that hindered the creation of benefits.110
The report must also assess the benefit corporation’s social and environ-
mental performance, in accordance with the consistent application of the
third party’s standard along with an explanation for any inconsistent
104 Under CAL. CORP. CODE § 2700(a), a director must act “in good faith, in a manner the
director believes to be in the best interests of the flexible purpose corporation and its share-
holders, and with that care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent per-
son in a like position would use under similar circumstances.” CAL. CORP. CODE § 2700(a)
(West 2012). There is no significant difference between this standard and that set forth
in CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) for traditional corporations. See id. § 309(a).
105 CAL. CORP. CODE § 2700(c)–(d) (West 2012).
106 See Keith Paul Bishop, How Should Benefit Corporation Directors Make Decisions?,
CAL. CORP. & SECS. L. (Oct. 17, 2011), http://calcorporatelaw.com/2011/10/how-should-benefit
-corporation-directors-make-decisions/.
107 See id. (suggesting several decision rules but concluding that the lack of prioritization
is “Why The Benefit Corporation Law Is Flawed”). See also Rae Andre, Assessing the
Accountability of the Benefit Corporation: Will This New Gray Sector Organization
Enhance Corporate Social Responsibility?, J. BUS. ETHICS 139–40 (2012).
108 JONATHAN KLICK & JOSHUA D. WRIGHT, GROCERY BAG BANS AND FOODBORNE
ILLNESSES (2012), available at http://www.utexas.edu/law/colloquium/papers-public/2012
-2013/10-01-12_Grocery%20Bag%20Bans%20and%20Foodborne%20Illness.pdf.
109 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 14630(a) (West 2012); HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D.11 (West 2011);
N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1708 (McKinney 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-791 (2011); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.14(a) (West 2011).
110 See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-791 (2011).
2013] NEW CORPORATE FORMS AND GREEN BUSINESS 365
application.111 A few states have added additional disclosure require-
ments, such as Vermont, that require the listing of specific actions the
benefit corporation could take to improve its performance.112 New Jersey
provides for disclosure of the directors’ compensation and the identity of
five percent or greater shareholders,113 and California requires a descrip-
tion of the process and rationale for the use of the third-party standard
and information that might affect the credibility of the standard.114
This report must then be made available to shareholders and
posted on a publicly accessible portion of the benefit corporation’s web-
site.115 Most states allow benefit corporations to remove old benefit reports
from their website.116 Some states also require the benefit corporation to
file the report with a relevant state agency.117
Those states which require a benefit director, discussed under cor-
porate governance, also require that the report includes her statement
regarding whether the benefit corporation complied in all material re-
spects with the state’s act and in accordance with its benefit purpose.118
A flexible purpose corporation must also produce a “social purpose
report”119 (in Washington) or a “special purpose current report”120 (in
111 See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-791(A)(2)–(A)(2)(a) (2011).
112 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.14(a)(1)(D) (West 2011) (requiring disclosure of the
“[s]pecific actions the benefit corporation can take to improve its social and environ-
mental performance and attain the goals or outcomes identified for creating general pub-
lic benefit and any specific public benefit”). Vermont also requires that shareholders have
a reasonable opportunity to review the report and then either approve or reject it by
majority vote. § 13.1-791(c).
113 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11(a)(1)(4)–(5) (West 2011). See also CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 14630(a)(1)(A) (West 2012); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1708 (West 2012) (identifying five
percent shareholders).
114 CAL. CORP. CODE § 14630 (West 2012). See also N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1708(b)(c)
(West 2012).
115 See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-791(c) (2011).
116 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D.11(d) (West 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11(c) (West
2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-791(c) (2011).
117 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11 (West 2011) (requiring that the benefit cor-
poration must deliver a copy of the benefit report to the Department of the Treasury).
Illinois originally included a requirement for the central filing of the benefit report, but
a senate committee amendment removed it. Bill Status of SB 2897, ILL. GEN. ASSEMB.,
http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=2897&GAID=11&DocTypeID
=SB&LegId=63455&SessionID=84 (last visited Jan. 31, 2013).
118 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-7 (West 2011). See also HAW. REV. STAT. § 420D-7 (West
2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.10 (West 2011).
119 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.25.150 (West 2012).
120 CAL. CORP. CODE § 3501(a) (West 2012).
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California) that is substantially similar to an annual benefit report, except
that it is not based on third-party standards and there is no statement
by a benefit director.121 In California, shareholders can also waive the
special purpose current reports if there are fewer than one hundred share-
holders and waivers by two thirds of the shares.122
These reports are in many ways similar to corporate social re-
sponsibility reporting, albeit with more specifically required elements.
121 CAL. CORP. CODE § 3501(b)(1)–(5). California requires some additional details. In par-
ticular the articles shall include:
(1) Identification and discussion of the short-term and long-term
objectives of the flexible purpose corporation relating to its
special purpose or purposes, and an identification and expla-
nation of any changes made in those special purpose objectives
during the fiscal year.
(2) Identification and discussion of the material actions taken by
the flexible purpose corporation during the fiscal year to achieve
its special purpose objectives, the impact of those actions, in-
cluding the causal relationships between the actions and the re-
ported outcomes, and the extent to which those actions achieved
the special purpose objectives for the fiscal year.
(3) Identification and discussion of material actions, including the
intended impact of those actions, that the flexible purpose cor-
poration expects to take in the short term and long term with
respect to achievement of its special purpose objectives.
(4) A description of the process for selecting, and an identification
and description of, the financial, operating, and other measures
used by the flexible purpose corporation during the fiscal year
for evaluating its performance in achieving its special purpose
objectives, including an explanation of why the flexible purpose
corporation selected those measures and identification and dis-
cussion of the nature and rationale for any material changes
in those measures made during the fiscal year.
(5) Identification and discussion of any material operating and
capital expenditures incurred by the flexible purpose corpora-
tion during the fiscal year in furtherance of achieving the spe-
cial purpose objectives, a good faith estimate of any additional
material operating or capital expenditures the flexible purpose
corporation expects to incur over the next three fiscal years in
order to achieve its special purpose objectives, and other mate-
rial expenditures of resources incurred by the flexible purpose
corporation during the fiscal year, including employee time, in
furtherance of achieving the special purpose objectives, including
a discussion of the extent to which that capital or use of other
resources serves purposes other than and in addition to fur-
thering the achievement of the special purpose objectives.
122 CAL. CORP. CODE § 3502(h) (West 2012).
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Corporations can already publish annual benefit reports, and are already
required to disclose some environmental related information.123
There may in fact be a “growing trend of traditional financial re-
porting and sustainability issues intersecting”124 and moreover there is
likely “significant progress in CSR reporting in the last couple of years
both in terms of quality and quantity.”125 That said, companies pick and
choose what they wish to disclose, resulting in incommensurate reports126
and the fear of greenwashing.127 Forbes, for example, noted that “[t]oday’s
consumer landscape is saturated with marketing campaigns that prom-
ise customers green(er) services or products but are challenged to deliver
substantiated data that empowers, educates and connects with buyers
[sic] values.”128
123 The United States requires some reporting of environmental related information. See
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1504 (2010)
(requiring listed companies to disclose certain payments regarding the development of
natural resources); Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Reporting, 40 C.F.R. § 372.22 (2010) (re-
quiring companies with greater than 10 employees to report to the EPA data regarding
the emission of listed toxic chemicals). Other countries, notably European nations, have
far more extensive reporting requirements. See Katelijne van Wensen et al., The State of
Play in Sustainability Reporting in the European Union, EU (2011), http://www.reportingcsr
.org/european-p-45.html.
124 See Deborah Fleischer, Ernst & Young, Triple Bottom Line Reporting and What CEOs
Should Ask About It, TRIPLE PUNDIT (Oct 26, 2010), http://www.triplepundit.com/2010/10
/ernst-young-triple-bottom-line-reporting-ceos-about/ (discussing the “business case for
sustainability reporting”); Michael Sater, CSR in Annual Reports: 7 Conflicting Trends,
FORBES (Jul. 20, 2011, 10:30 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/csr/2011/07/20/csr-in-annual
-reports-7-conflicting-trends/ (noting that even though “[p]ublic companies in the U.S.
are, by law, required to disclose financial results only . . . a majority of annual reports in-
creasingly address[ ]social responsibility, sustainable practices and corporate giving[.]”).
125 Raz Godelnik, Back to Basics: What Is CSR Reporting?, TRIPLE PUNDIT (June 6, 2012),
http://www.triplepundit.com/2012/06/csr-reporting/. Shareholders are also pushing for
increased social and environmental awareness. See Sater, supra note 124 (noting that
midway through the 2011 proxy season shareholders had filed ninety-six resolutions on
climate and energy issues).
126 Sarah Tschiggfrie, R. E. Lee Scholar Researches Corporate Social Responsibility
Reporting, WASH. & LEE U. (Oct. 12, 2012), http://news.blogs.wlu.edu/2012/10/12/r-e-lee
-scholar-researches-corporate-social-responsibility-reporting/ (“In looking at all these
different CSR reports, it is clear that there are enormous variations from firm to firm,
both in the way they go about reporting CSR, the things that they measure and the things
that they don’t measure.”) (quoting Rob Straughan, Associate Dean of the Washington
& Lee Williams School of Commerce, Economics, and Politics).
127 Jacob Vos, Actions Speak Louder than Words: Greenwashing in Corporate America,
23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 673, 673–74 (2009).
128 Sater, supra note 124.
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Although there are several organizations that have or are trying
to develop CSR reporting standards, and some expect that there will “be
a convergence around a smaller subset of CSR reporting standards,” this
could easily take ten to fifteen years, if it happens at all.129 The annual
benefit report will not necessarily change this, except to the degree that
a few third-party standard setters require it.130
There is also a tension between permitting flexibility in reporting
and requiring conformity, which makes comparisons between businesses
easier. There is a reason the Securities and Exchange Commission spells
out requirements for financial reporting.
Patagonia’s experience may be illustrative. It published an au-
dited corporate social responsibility report in 2004, based on the Global
Reporting Initiative, an organization that develops and disseminates re-
porting guidelines.131 Patagonia decided the report was inauthentic and
did not reflect the company well.132 Patagonia’s director of environmental
analysis stated, “It was as boring as all the other reports out there—it felt
like a marketing statement.”133 The CEO, Yvon Chouinard, was harsher,
calling it “absolute bullshit.”134 Since then, Patagonia has produced the
“Footprint Chronicles” which they believe is more honest and accurate,
and helps to reduce their adverse social and environmental impacts.135
The company also notes that they “know that when we can reduce or
eliminate a harm, other businesses will be eager to follow suit.”136
There are other potential advantages with the benefit report. As
one blog notes, with Patagonia’s enhanced disclosure, “Life is going to be
tougher and more uncomfortable for more clothing companies thanks to
Patagonia’s increasing disclosure.”137 Moreover, some make a business case
for disclosure, above and beyond the potential marketing advantages.138
129 Tschiggfrie, supra note 126.
130 See Reiser, supra note 59, at 600–01.
131 GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, https://globalreporting.org/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2013).
132 JEFFREY HOLLENDER & BILL BREEN, THE RESPONSIBILITY REVOLUTION: HOW THE NEXT
GENERATION OF BUSINESS WILL WIN 89 (2010).
133 Id.
134 See id.
135 The Footprint Chronicles, PATAGONIA, http://www.patagonia.com/us/footprint/ (last
visited Jan. 31, 2013).
136 Id.
137 Leon Kaye, Patagonia Maps Out Its Supply Chain for Even More Transparency,
TRIPLE PUNDIT (May 16, 2012), http://www.triplepundit.com/2012/05/patagonia-footprint
-chronicles-supply-chain-transparency/.
138 See, e.g., Sustainable and Responsible Business, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu
/enterprise/policies/sustainable-business/corporate-social-responsibility/reporting
-disclosure/index_en.htm.
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The European Commission “[b]y disclosing social, environmental and gover-
nance information, enterprises often find that they can better identify and
manage issues that influence their business success. Good disclosure of
non-financial information enables investors to contribute to a more efficient
allocation of capital and better achieve longer-term investment goals.”139
Third-party standards. In order to judge whether a benefit corpo-
ration is achieving its general public benefit, statutes require the use of
a third-party standard.140 This third-party standard must be developed
by a party that is independent of the benefit corporation.141 It must be
“[c]omprehensive in its assessment of the effect of the business and its
operations upon the interests listed that the board shall and may con-
sider when making decisions,”142 such as information relevant to the
criteria selected, the relative weights of the criteria, the revisions pro-
cess, the standard setting body, including its owners, leadership, and the
process by which the leadership changes. B Lab is the most prominent
standard setter, but other organizations like Green Seal143 and Green
America144 are intended to be eligible as standard setters for green busi-
nesses.145 In contrast, flexible purpose and social purpose corporations,
like other corporations, may engage third parties to set standards, but
are not required to do so.146
Some have also noted that there may be a conflict of interest, in
that B Lab, an early proponent of benefit corporations, is likely the most
important third-party standard provider.147 It has apparently developed
a standard that is available to interested corporations starting at $25,000
per year.148 Proponents of the flexible purpose corporation have also argued
139 Id.
140 See CLARK & VRANKA, supra note 72, at 1.
141 See id. at 18.
142 HAW. REV. STAT. § 414D.12 (West 2010).
143 See About Green Seal, GREEN SEAL, http://www.greenseal.org/AboutGreenSeal.aspx
(last visited Jan. 10, 2013) (“We develop life cycle-based sustainability standards for prod-
ucts, services and companies and offer third-party certification for those that meet the
criteria in the standard.”).
144 See What We Do, GREEN AM., http://www.greenamerica.org/about/whatwedo/ (last vis-
ited Jan. 31, 2013) (“Promoting green and fair trade business principles while building
the market for businesses adhering to these principles.”).
145 See CLARK & VRANKA, supra note 72, at 3, 24.
146 See id. at App. C, 8.
147 See Andre, supra note 107, at 140.
148 See Colin C. Richard, California Adopts Two New Corporate Forms to Advance Social
Benefits, GIBSON DUNN (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages
/CAAdoptsTwoNewCorporateForms-AdvanceSocialBenefits.aspx.
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that the use of third-party standards could in fact stifle innovation in the
future, or could “devolve into a ‘back-door’ means for regulating certain
products or pursuing other controversial public policy objectives and,
ultimately, would lead any discussion of such a legislative proposal into
the turmoil of special interests.”149
Enforceability/derivative suits. Corporate directors can be sued for
their breach of fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.150 Based on a some-
what murky division, depending primarily on the kind of harm caused
by the breach, these suits may either be direct on the part of the share-
holders or derivative on the part of the corporation.151 Several states have
introduced an analogous procedure, the benefit enforcement proceeding,
as a means of ensuring that directors and officers perform their duties,
including the pursuit of the general and specific public benefit.152
These lawsuits may generally be brought derivatively by a share-
holder, or a director, although some states also permit the benefit corpo-
ration itself to bring an action,153 or any person specified in the articles or
bylaws.154 Just as derivative suits for the breach of the duty of care are very
difficult for the plaintiff to win,155 benefit enforcement proceedings are
likely to be the same. States include provisions that reduce the chance
of liability.156 For example, Virginia bars personal liability for the failure
of the benefit corporation to create a public benefit, or as long as the di-
rector has performed in compliance with the obligations set forth for a
traditional corporation, i.e., to act “in accordance with [the director’s]
good faith business judgment of the best interests of the corporation.”157
149 See Britt et al., supra note 87.
150 Douglas Y. Park, Fiduciary Duties of the Board of Directors: The Basics, DYP
ADVISORS (Aug. 22, 2011), http://www.dypadvisors.com/2011/08/22/fiduciary-duties-of
-board-of-directors-basics/.
151 Id.
152 See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-790 (2011).
153 See HAW. REV. STAT. § 414D-90 (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-790 (2011).
154 New Jersey and Vermont add to this list of anyone who owns ten percent or more of
the equity interests of a parent of a benefit corporation. N.J. STA. ANN. § 14A:18-10 (West
2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-790 (2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.13 (2011). See also
CAL. CORP. CODE § 14623 (West 2012) (setting a five percent threshold).
155 Directors & Officers—The ACE Report, ACE BERMUDA (2005), available at http://www
.acebermuda.com/AceBermudaRoot/AceBermuda/Media+Centre/D+and+O+Newsletter
/Derivative+Suits+Recent+Developments.htm.
156 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(A) (2011).
157 The Virginia Code provides that:
[i]n any proceeding brought by or in the right of a benefit corporation or
brought by or on behalf of the shareholders of a benefit corporation, a
director is not personally liable for monetary damages for: 1. Any action
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Moreover benefit corporations, just like traditional corporations, can in-
clude an exculpation clause in their articles.158
Governance Procedures. There are two changes that some states
have introduced that address the benefit corporation’s governance pro-
cedures: benefit directors and supermajority votes.159
The board of a benefit corporation in most states must include one
“benefit director,” who must be independent.160 In addition to the rights and
responsibilities of the other director, the benefit director prepares the state-
ment regarding the benefit corporation’s performance referenced above.161
Many states have chosen not to introduce the use of benefit directors.162
In order to change a benefit corporation’s purpose, typically a two-
thirds supermajority of the votes of each class of shareholders is required.163
Other states are silent on the question.164 In any case, a benefit corporation
could, in any state, impose a higher requirement for this kind of change.
A change, and for certain change of control transactions that would
materially affect the social mission, requires the approval of two-thirds
of the votes.165 Shareholders of social purpose and flexible purpose corpo-
rations are also given dissenters rights—essentially a put, i.e., the right
taken as a director if the director performed the duties of office in com-
pliance with § 13.1-690 and this section; or 2. Failure of the benefit cor-
poration to create general public benefit or any specific public benefit
specified in its articles of incorporation or bylaws or otherwise adopted
by the board of directors.
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-788(C) (2011). See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.09(d) (refer-
encing traditional corporation standards for directors).
158 Exculpatory clauses, of which Delaware General Corporate Law § 102(b)(7) is the most
prominent, allow for early dismissal of certain kinds of fiduciary duty claims. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2012).
159 See, e.g., Steven Munch, Improving the Benefit Corporation: How Traditional Governance
Mechanisms Can Enhance the Innovative New Form, 7 NW J.L. & SOC. POL’Y [I], 193
(2012) (discussing the new emerging trend of benefit directors); Felicia R. Resor, Benefit
Corporation Legislation, 12 WYO. L. REV. 91, 108 (2012) (discussing the benefits of the
supermajority vote).
160 See Munch, supra note 159.
161 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.12 (West 2011).
162 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 14620 (West 2012); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-
6C-07 (West 2012); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1707 (McKinney 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
788 (2011).
163 See, e.g., CAL CORP. CODE §§ 14601(d)(1)(B), 14610(d) (West 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 14A:18-5(d) (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.08 (West 2011).
164 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-06 (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-787 (2011).
165 CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 14601, 14610(d) (West 2012).
372 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 37:347
to sell, at fair value—in the event that the corporation’s purpose materi-
ally changes or it ceases to be a social purpose corporation.166
A two-thirds supermajority vote does not do much to protect a
green business. The widespread fear that a green business will sell out to
a conventional profit-maximizing company remain largely unaddressed. A
business, regardless of form, will not be sold in situations where 1) the di-
rectors and shareholders do not want to sell, or 2) where directors want to
sell but shareholders do not. Likewise the green business will be sold if both
directors and shareholders want to sell (though the benefit corporation
requires a modest supermajority). The difference between fifty percent plus
one and sixty six and two-thirds percent plus one will rarely be significant.
CONCLUSIONS
a. Modest benefits but modest costs
b. Consider other mission maintenance mechanisms:
longer terms for directors, stock with vetoes, de-
layed acquisitions (would lower the takeover pre-
mium), caps
c. Recognize limited role for law
There may also be concerns regarding financing. Just as angel or
venture capitalists may be uncomfortable with the LLC in comparison to
the corporation, even if there are tax advantages, they may be uncom-
fortable with a hybrid corporate form. In particular, directors of hybrid
organizations are seen to have more discretion.167 Of course, there are
some investors who may be attracted to the form as they want to invest
in socially oriented businesses.168
There are three main arguments made against these new forms:
they are unnecessary, potentially dangerous, and perhaps ineffective. The
forms are considered unnecessary, because whatever the new forms can
do, the old forms could do as well.
They are considered dangerous because of their potential misuse.
Consumers may believe that a benefit corporation is in fact pursuing a
more noble agenda than a traditional corporation. If in fact it is not, the
166 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 3000 (West 2012).
167 See Reiser, supra note 59.
168 See, e.g., About Us/What We Do, NEWGROUND SOC. INV., http://www.newground.net
/aboutus.asp (last visited Jan. 31, 2013) (focusing on socially responsible investment and
environmental, social, and governance factors).
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consumer will, in some sense, have been defrauded. The question is sim-
ply whether there is too great a risk of greenwashing with these new
forms. Obviously, fraud can be committed with any organizational form—
witness all the piercing the corporate veil legislation169—so the issue
would be whether the new forms substantially increase that risk.
There are, of course, several general advantages to these new
forms. Even if it is possible to duplicate the structure of a benefit or flex-
ible purpose corporation with the traditional corporation, using an off-
the-rack standard form will reduce transaction costs. Moreover, the use
of the state-sponsored form may serve a valuable signaling function to all
stakeholders. It is also possible the form may help shape preferences, in
that it expands the choices that an entrepreneur has. Finally, it may
allow greater authenticity and transparency among employees.
Overall, the new organizational forms are likely a modest im-
provement for those who support green business. They may conceivably
increase the number of green businesses. Perhaps the biggest issue is
that little has been done to ensure that resources will remain dedicated
to the green mission. Lawmakers and other entrepreneurs should con-
sider different ways of encouraging sticking to missions. There are
several legal ways this could be done. For example, the supermajority
necessary to convert a benefit corporation to a traditional corporation
could be raised, certain parties could be given veto rights by way of
preferred stock, boards of directors could be elected for longer periods,
and beneficiaries could be given additional representation.
169 See Sandra K. Miller, Piercing the Corporate Veil Among Affiliated Companies in the
European Union and in the U.S., 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 73, 90 (1998).
